If Colonel Matthias Ogden were stung by the rebuke he received in Washington's General Orders for "gaming", he certainly did not go out of his way to avoid the eye of his commander in chief in the weeks and months that followed.
On April 17th, 1779, barely a fortnight after the results of his court martial were made known to the Army - acquitted on three counts, guilty on the fourth - his name heads the list of officers from the 1st New Jersey in a "Memorial from the Officers of the Jersey Brigade to the Legislature" protesting the meager pay of the troops in the strongest terms. Almost 50 officers from the three New Jersey battalions signed this document - none more than the 21 who did so in Ogden's regiment.
It was soon followed by a much more lengthy (it would be fair to say "long winded") letter from General William Maxwell, the commander of the Jersey Brigade, and a second letter from a number of junior officers of the 1st New Jersey, including Captain Aaron Ogden (the Colonel's brother) and Ensign Asher Levy.
Maxwell also forwarded these letters to Washington, who was highly alarmed, twice expressing his displeasure directly to General Maxwell:
"There is nothing, which has happened in the course of the war that has given me so much pain as the remonstrance you mention from the officers of the 1st. Jersey Regiment. I cannot but consider it as a hasty and imprudent step, which on more cool consideration they will themselves condemn. I am very sensible of the inconveniences under which the officers of the army labor and I hope they do me the justice to believe, that my endeavours (sic) to procure them relief are incessant. There is however more difficulty in satisfying their wishes than perhaps they are aware; our resources have been hitherto very limited; the situation of our money is no small embarrassment, for which, though there are remedies, they cannot be the work of a moment."
He was also a shrewd politician, as demonstrated in the following excerpt from a letter to President of Congress dated May 11th, 1779:
This is an affair which Congress will no doubt view in a very serious light. To me it appears truly alarming. It shows what is to be apprehended, if some adequate provision is not generally made for the officers. I have frequently taken the liberty to suggest my sentiments of what ought to be done. The subject was particularly discussed in my late interviews with the Committee of conference. A repetition would be needless. I shall observe that the distresses in some corps are so great, either where they were not till lately attached to particular states, or where the states have been less provident, that officers have solicited even to be supplied with the cloathing (sic) destined for the common soldiery coarse and unsuitable as they were. I had not power to comply with the request.The patience of men, animated by a sense of duty and honour will support them to a certain point, beyond which it will not go. I doubt not Congress will be sensible of the danger of an extreme in this respect, and will pardon my anxiety to obviate it.
I view the conduct of the officers concerned in the present instance as highly blameable (sic); and I have signified my disapprobation. I trust the mode will not be thought too mild, when our situation is considered. The causes of discontent are too great and too general and the ties that bind the officers to the service too feeble to admit of rigor.Their letter to me in which they undertake to justify their conduct was embarrassing. I thought it best to take no direct notice of it; because I must either have done too much for our circumstances, or too little for the nature of the proceeding. I contented myself with writing the letter to General Maxwell of the 10th."
Washington assigned the Jersey Brigade to General Sullivan for the upcoming campaign against the Iroquois. While he seems by mid-April at the latest to had the Jersey men in mind for this assignment, there probably was in this decision both the recognition that they had been until lately among the best he had, and that "idle hands are the devil's workshop" and so hopefully they would be too busy fighting on the frontier to be airing their grievances back home. Politics were hardly absent under Sullivan, but no such letters were dispatched from Iroquoia to cause the Commander in Chief fresh pain.
Of the officers of the 1st New Jersey who were called to testify at Ogden's trial, there is only evidence that one of these, Captain John van Angeln/Anglen, went on Sullivan's expedition, and he was on detached service acting as Commissary of the 3rd Brigade (Hand's) rather than Captain of the 7th company in the 1st New Jersey which was now under Captain Peter Voorhies. On August 10th at Fort Wyoming, he was charged at court martial for "brutally assaulting" Sergeant Lewis Rieskly of the German Regiment and sentenced to be severely reprimanded in Sullivan's General Orders. A portion of this reprimand reads:
"[The Commander] can never suffer Officers to beat and abuse their Fellow Soldiers wantonly; Blows should never be given Given but except when they are necessary to the Preservation of order and Discipleing (sic) and...Unaccountable with these Marks of Malevolence and Cruelty which, were Apparent in the Whole of Captain van Angler's Behaviour, which renders his Conduct still more Criminal was that [the victim] was a Con Commissioner Offr"
Had this happened under Washington's eye, there is little doubt that he would have been cashiered for such ungentlemanly conduct. As it was, he resigned on January 1st, 1781 and did not continue in the next establishment of the battalion, and received an invalid's pension prior to his death in 1812.
Isaac Morrison was no longer in command of his old company, either, but whether his Germantown wound prevented him resuming command or there was some other reason why he was supplanted is not clear. He moved to Kentucky after the war. John Polhemus, whose commission as Major on January 4th, 1778 may have been very brief, as he is believed to have been declared a supernumerary officer that year, was likewise not part of the 1st New Jersey when it went against the Iroquois.
Quite possibly, Morrison, Van Angeln and Polhemus were not even serving with the regiment at the time of the trial, and they certainly were not involved with its subsequent maneuvers. As for Ensign Asher Levy, he never made it to Sullivan's expedition either, because he was in jail as a suspected Tory.
Asher Levy , whose name sometimes appears as Asher Lewis, holds the distinction as the only Jewish officer in the Jersey Line - perhaps even the only known Jew in the ranks. His grandfather Asher (Asser) Levy was the only Jew who remained in New Amsterdam when Peter Stuyvesant surrendered to the British. Ensign Levy was born in 1756 and his family in New York were loyalists. He enlisted in the 1st New Jersey on September 12, 1778 and resigned June 14th, 1779 (Heitman says July 14th, 1779). The timing of his resignation is very interesting in the aftermath of the trial of his Colonel at which he was called to give evidence. According to Oscar Reiss' "The Jews of Colonial America ";
"He was jailed in Burlington, New Jersey, on the suspicion of being a Tory. Levy escaped on March 25th, 1780, but he was recaptured and escaped again on August 9th, 1780. he went to his family in New York who were Tories. There he married Margaret Mary Thompson and moved to Philadelphia, where he died in 1785."
Perhaps Asher Levy did have Tory sympathies. Perhaps he was a convenient scapegoat as the person with the lowest status who may have crossed his Colonel at trial. If Captain van Angeln was sent on detached service as 3rd Brigade Commissary after the trial, this may indicate that he could no longer serve under Colonel Ogden after his testimony. Or it may indicate that he had already been supplanted as supernumerary by Captain Voorhies. By as Ensign Levy resigned from the service and was imprisoned some time after, it has to be considered that his testimony had been damaging to Colonel Ogden and may have related to the charge of gaming for which he was convicted.
As for the other officers of the New Jersey Line who were involved in the trial, Lt. Colonel D'Hart continued under Col. Shreve in the 2nd New Jersey and continued with the regiment when it was consolidated with the3rd battalion in 1781. More information continues to come to light about his service, indicating that he stayed with the 1st NJ until late 1778 before transferring to the 2nd. He also was briefly arrested at Yorktown and scheduled for court martial, but whether the cause these charges were dropped three days later. Whether this indicates a conflict with Ogden or not can only be speculated, but it is curious that the Dayton's New Jersey Brigade had been combined into a single battalion not a week before D'Hart's arrest, placing him once again under Matthias Ogden.
Major Conway rejoined the 1st New Jersey as Lt. Col. under Mathias Ogden on Sullivan's Expedition, transferring from Dayton's 3rd New Jersey with a commission dated July 5th, 1779. He served until the reestablishment of the New Jersey Line on January 1, 1781. From this it would seem that his testimony at Ogden's court martial did not injure their professional relationship.
There is much more I would like to know about this episode in my ancestral past and this period of history, and many more leads to explore. The surviving primary source material in Washington's letters for the court martial of Matthias Ogden offered a basic framework to begin this inquiry. Tracking down leads and developing explanations in this series for how events transpired has been a grand hunt, but as is always the case in uncovering new data there are always more questions to ask, more hypotheses to refine.
There is no simple explanation for why Isaac Morrison brought charges against his Colonel and others testified at his trial. Nor is there a clear case to be made that Ogden was falsely charged on the points where he was acquitted, or for what subsequently became of those who gave evidence. There are strong indications that in an officer corps that was united only in its grievances about relative rank, status and pay, some of these men to resent and later accuse their Colonel who seemed to have things always break his way. It is an old story, as familiar from office politics today as it was in Washington's army. For now, let that suffice.
After sitting in judgment throughout the month of March, 1779, the court martial of Col. Matthias Ogden reached its verdict. According to custom, Colonel Otho Holland Williams the presiding officer would have forwarded the proceedings to Washington's headquarters for confirmation of any recommended sentence and subsequent publishing of the findings in General Orders.
Col. Ogden, readers of this series will recall, was charged by Captain Isaac Morrison with
"1st. Neglect of duty in general. 2nd. Repeated frauds against the Public and also the officers and soldiers under his command. 3rd. Cowardice. 4th. Gaming."
The court heard evidence from a number of officers of the New Jersey Line who were then serving, or had previously served under Col. Ogden, as well as from both an assistant quartermaster to the Jersey troops and a former Brigadier General of militia. The officers empaneled to hear the case were a full Colonel, three Lt. Colonels, a Major and seven Captains from the Virginia, Maryland and Pennsylvania Lines.
Throughout this series, we have explored the circumstances which prevailed among the officers of the Jersey Line, examined what is known of the careers and characters of those involved with the case, and tried to flesh out from the scanty written record what lay behind the charges as a means to understand the way the trial played out. It is certain that in the process more questions have been raised than answered, particularly concerning the service records and status of some of the officers involved in the case. Nonetheless, it was Colonel Ogden who was on trial and not his accusers, and it is time to consider the verdict.
The results of Ogden's court martial appeared in Washington's General Orders of April, 2nd, 1779. The court martial;
"have declared it their opinion, "That he is not guilty of the 1st. charge, that he is not guilty of the second, and are unanimously of opinion that he is not guilty of the 3rd. charge and have unanimously acquitted him with honor."
These findings strongly vindicate Colonel Ogden as an officer and gentleman of integrity whose honor and personal bravery were found to be above reproach. They are consistent with his record of service, and the marks of favor as a promising young officer which he seems to have enjoyed from those in high command. If his accusor Isaac Morrison and others in Ogden's command felt personally cheated by their Colonel, this was not substantiated at his trial. It may well be that Colonel Ogden was less attentive than he should have been as an administrator of his battalion, and the nature of the trial itself suggests that he did not enjoy the necessary respect of his subordinates to maintain discipline in camp.
Indiscipline, it must be acknowledged, was not restricted to disgruntled underlings in the 1st New Jersey. There was still the fourth charge of "Gaming". On this, the court martial
"are unanimously of opinion that he is guilty of the 4th. charge, being a breach of the Commander in Chief's orders dated the 8th. of January 1778, and have sentenced him to be severely reprimanded in general orders."
Having failed to make the case that Colonel Ogden was a neglectful, dishonest and cowardly officer, Captain Morrison appears to have found his Achilles' Heel with the gaming charge. We can speculate that former Brigadier General of Militia Matthias Williamson's testimony may have had a bearing on this charge, as he was not under the same injunction against gaming as were the officers and men of the Continental Army. The unanimous verdict indicates that the evidence that Colonel Ogden indulged in games of chance, either with cards or dice, was overwhelming.
I am indebted to Larry Schmidt, a fine historian with detailed knowledge of the New Jersey Line who has taken an interest in my occasional pieces on this subject, for calling my attention to an entry from Jacob Piatt's Orderly Book for the 1st NJ (Nov. 20, 1777 to Feb. 18, 1778) that sheds light on the seriousness with which the Commander in Chief viewed the charge of gaming. It records a court martial in which a Lt. Jonathan Rush of the 10th Virginia was accused of "abusing & aggravating Lt. Bradwater to strike him, for Giting (sic) drunk, playing at Cards, and beating Capt. Lavid on the Sabbath day, whilst he the sd. Capt. Lavid was under Arest (sic)." Lt. Rush:
"was found guilty of a breach of the 21 Article 14 section of the Articles of War, and also a breach of Genl. Orders, and sentenced to be Discharged the Service, but as Lt. Rush has formerly bore the Character of a good officer, The Court are pleased to recommend him to the Consideration of his excellency Genl. Washington to have him reinstated to his Rank...The Commander in Chief approves the sentence, but is Concerned he Cannot Reinstate Lt. Rush, in Compliance of the recommendation of the Court founded upon his former good Character as an Officer, his behaviour in several Instances Alledged (sic) was so flagrant and scandalous the Genl. thinks his continuance in the service Would be a disgrace to it, and as one part of the Charge against him was Gamin, That alone would excuse him from all indulgence, a Vice of so pernicious a Nature, that it will not escape the severest punishment with his Approbation."
Washington's standing prohibition on gaming dates from the winter encampment at Valley Forge and was only the latest in a succession of orders that vainly attempted to suppress the vice in his army. The General Orders of January 8th, 1778 state:
"The Commander in Chief is informed that gaming is again creeping into the Army; in a more especial manner among the lower staff in the environs of the camp. He therefore in the most solemn terms declares, that this Vice in either Officer or soldier, shall not when detected, escape exemplary punishment; and to avoid discrimination between play and gaming forbids Cards and Dice under any pretence (sic) whatsoever."
Although the fun loving Colonel Ogden seems to have taken a different view of gaming than the Commander in Chief, this was not a youthful indiscretion that could be indulged even were Washington so inclined (and he certainly was not). Congress may have instituted a national lottery to help finance the war, but Washington's clear policy in his Army left him no room for maneuver, and thus Ogden's "severe reprimand" appeared in General Orders following the release of the court martial proceedings:
"The General approves the sentence of the Court and it gives him pleasure to find that Colonel Ogden of whom he always entertained a high opinion, has been acquitted of the three first charges exhibited against him; He also would have been happy if there had been no circumstances to justify the fourth and last; but he is under the painful necessity of observing, that there are circumstances, and such too as most fully authorize the sentence of the Court. The General is sorry that a Gentleman at the head of a Regiment who both in practice and precept ought to shew the most pointed attention and adherence to all orders, to influence and determine the conduct of those, acting in subordinate stations to him, should be among the first to break them.The officer who acts thus, countenances a relaxation of discipline and the introduction of disorder, and cannot prevent, much less punish, offences (sic) in others which he himself commits.
All General Orders are in force 'till they are set aside or altered by subsequent ones issuing from proper authority or 'till the occasion ceases which produced them. Colo. Ogdon knows this and he must have known also that the particular
order which was the subject of the Court Martial's consideration of the 4th. charge against him, remained unalter'd and the infraction of it is more censurable, if possible, than that of any other, inasmuch as the order was intended to prevent the most pernicious Vice that can obtain in an Army, the vice of gaming!"
It was a stinging chastisement by the pater familias of a wayward son, but all things considered Ogden got off lightly. He still retained his command and Washington managed to praise him while condemning his poor judgment. Perhaps, like J.E.B. Stuart rebuked by Lee at Gettysburg, the unaccustomed displeasure of his Commander was a goad to corrective behavior. Ogden's future record of service and correspondence with the Commander in Chief does not indicate that he suffered lasting discredit in Washington's eyes. Still, one has to wonder whether it affected him in other ways, particularly in his relations with the officers who testified at his trial. We shall examine the aftermath of the court martial and the subsequent fates of its participants in the concluding post in this series.
There are very few surviving transcripts of proceedings from Revolutionary War courts martial. Precise records may not have been kept, or may have been retained by the presiding officer, or were subsequently lost. or buried unremarked in far-flung archives.
There is no written record that I have been able to discover of the evidence presented and questions posed at the court martial of Col. Matthias Ogden during March of 1779. The previous posts in this series have attempted to place the trial within the context of the events, personalities and conflicts within the New Jersey Line that may have had a bearing on the charges and those called to testify. Now it is time to turn to what is little is known about the actual trial itself.
The date for Ogden's court martial was set for March 2nd at the Continental Army's main winter encampment at Middlebrook, now part of Bound Brook and surrounding New Jersey towns. Col. Otho Holland Williams of the 6th Maryland Regiment (whose image appears at left) was named as presiding officer. Williams' revolutionary service to this point included marching to the siege of Boston with a company of riflemen and his wounding and subsequent capture at Fort Washington in late 1776 while Major of Stephenson's Maryland and Virginia Rifle Regiment. Imprisoned for a time in New York in the same cell with Ethan Allen, he was promoted to colonel of the 6th Maryland while still a captive and did not join his new command until January, 1778. His papers at the Maryland Historical society are fascinating but do not appear to contain anything regarding the court martial of Col. Ogden.
The rest of the officers empaneled to try Col. Ogden included
The contributing brigades along with Woodford's Virginians would likely have included Scott's (VA), Muhlenbergs (VA), the 1st and 2nd Pennsylvania Brigades of Waynes Division, the 1st and 2nd Maryland Brigades, and possibly Maxwell's Jersey Brigade though it was posted at Elizabethtown and the case involved a number of its officers. That would have made a panel of 13 which is hard to credit, and in any event it is unlikely that any captain selected from the Jersey Brigade would have come from Ogden's regiment.
From Col. Ogden's perspective, the selection of these officers to consider the charges against him probably meant as impartial a hearing as he was likely to get from a military tribunal in the continental army.
The court convened at 11 in the morning on March 2nd. Four days later on March 5th, the court martial adjourned and prepared to reconvene at 10:00 a.m. on the 8th at Smith's Tavern in Elizabethtown . This change of venue may have been selected so that the witnesses from the Jersey Brigade stationed there would be able to testify as well as see to their official duties. Middlebrook was a considerable distance from Elizabethtown so this seems a likely explanation. It was in any case a highly favorable development for Colonel Ogden to have his trial take place on his home ground, though one does wonder how it impacted the business at Samuel Smith's tavern to have the tribunal in session at this establishment through the rest of the month.
Nonetheless, the court martial remained empaneled until concluding its deliberations on March 30th, 1779 after which it was dissolved. Possibly the court considered other cases besides Ogden's, but its verdict did not appear in General Orders until April 2nd.
Aside from the verdict, this is all the documentation that I have found of the trial proceedings. One has to wonder whether the various men summoned to give evidence in support of the charges were as fervent in their claims as Captain Morrison who proffered them. Some of the men called to testify had not been under Ogden's command since 1777 (Lt. Colonel William D'Hart and Major John Conway). Captain Polhemus may no longer have been a serving officer, but one can only speculate whether he would have faulted his old Colonel for his becoming supernumerary or hoped to be reinstated. Former Brigadier General of Militia Matthias Williamson, a fellow Elizabethan and well known to Ogden, most likely was called to give evidence of the fourth charge - 'gaming" - for had this involved other serving officers in Washington's army one suspects they would have been held to account for their actions.
And what of Captain John van Anglen, Ensign Asher Levy and Assistant Quartermaster Robert Kelso? Were they also aggrieved, or did Captain Morrison believe they could provide evidence that would substantiate his charges? As for that, the verdict of the trial and the subsequent careers of those who came before it to give evidence may hold clues as to the nature of their testimony and that of the other witnesses. We will consider the verdict in the next post of this series.
During the winter of 1778-1779, when the warring armies in America were settling in to their winter quarters, George Washington wrote the following orders to General William Maxwell for his Jersey Brigade:
Middle Brook, December 21, 1778.You are appointed to the command at Elizabeth Town at which place you are to remain with the New Jersey Brigade: But should you be of opinion that the troops can be more conveniently quartered by removing part to New Ark, you may order a Regiment or as many to that place as circumstances shall require.
The principal object of your position is to prevent the Enemy stationed upon Staten Island from making incursions upon the main and also to prevent any traffic between them and the inhabitants. In this respect I must request you to be very vigilant and to use your utmost exertions as great complaints have been made of a trade's being carried on so openly and to such a height, as to alarm and give great umbrage to the well affected. I am informed that considerable quantities of provision are carried over to and goods brought from Staten Island thro' Woodbridge and Raway (sic) Necks, you will therefore either keep patrols or post small parties upon that quarter, as you shall judge most expedient and likely to prevent such intercourse.
Maxwell's task was also to gather intelligence about the intentions of the enemy both on his front and, if possible, from their command center in New York, and Washington cautioned later that winter; "The season advances when the enemy will begin to stir, and we should if possible be acquainted with their motions."
Washington gave explicit instructions regarding granting too many furloughs to officers to leave their regiments, but for Col. Matthias Ogden this was home turf and it is likely that he found quarters at his own residence in Elizabethtown. The Jersey Brigade was used to operating in this region, as its proximity to occupied Staten Island made it vulnerable to frequent royalist raids, often guided by loyalist refugees from Elizabethtown. For the Elizabethians in the 1st New Jersey, this meant that they were on their guard even as they spent the war's customary "off season" in their own hometown. It also may have impacted discipline in the regiment, especially with a fun loving Colonel like Ogden on his own home ground and others who were not close enough to their homes in nearby counties to see to their personal affairs without a furlough.
It also meant that they were vulnerable to surprise. Washington wrote in anger that February about what he believed was the inattention Lieutenant Pierson of the 1st New Jersey who was surprised at Bonhamtown. The most serious attack took place on February 25th, when raiders destroyed the Elizabethtown Barracks, the parsonage of the 1st Presbyterian Church, and damaged Governor Livingston's residence taking thirty prisoners. Aaron
Ogden was wounded in the side by a bayonet during the raid, but
made a full recovery. It is not clear from Washington's correspondence whether Matthias Ogden, facing pending court martial proceedings, was under arrest or in command of his regiment during these raids, though a history of Elizabeth claimed he was fully involved in the pursuit of the raiders. In any case, the military situation on the front lines was compromised by the lack of firm hands in command and Ogden's trial could not have helped matters.
Washington had much more on his mind aside from annoyance raids from Staten Island. He was deep in the planning stages for the upcoming campaign season, and he had specific plans in mind for the Jersey Brigade. Writing in the end of January to one of his frontier commanders, Washington said;
"I hope by pursuing a steady and properly concerted plan next Campaign we may, if we cannot engage the friendship of the savages, reduce them to the necessity of remaining quiet. To effect this, it is determined, at present, to carry the War into the Indian Country next Spring as early as the season and the state of our Magazines will admit. No particular plan is yet fixed, nor are the places which will be the most proper objects of attack yet marked out."
These preparations were in response to the Wyoming Massacre in Pennsylvania, and Washington was formulating a response that would send a punitive expedition deep into Iroquois Country. He made inquires of knowledgeable subordinates "of the different Routs (sic) leading to the Country of the Six Nations by land and Water, having particular regard to the distances, face of the Country, and kind of navigation." He made the same request of General Maxwell. As Ogden's trial got underway in early March, Washington had already settled for his second choice of commander for this expedition, in the weeks after its conclusion Washington's correspondence with Maxwell indicates that he intended the New Jersey Brigade to participate.
It is not likely that the commander in chief was waiting for the outcome of Ogden's trial before deciding on whether the Jersey Brigade would go against the Iroquois, but in the weeks that followed he had more problems with many officers throughout the entire Jersey Line than those that had lately beset the commander of the 1st New Jersey. We will examine that state of affairs in a subsequent post, but the stage is now set for the trial of Matthias Ogden, and we shall pick up the story with what is known about the actual proceedings in the next post in this series.
Aaron Ogden wrote an autobiography late in life with highlights of his Revolutionary service. So did Joseph Plumb Martin, whose memoir is the most widely cited record left by a private solider in Washington's army. So did John P. Becker, who was a 12-year-old teamster with Henry Knox and whose Sexagenary was likewise written as an old man. And so did Major John Polhemus, one of the men named to give evidence in 1779 at the court martial of Col. Matthias Ogden.
Aside from allowing old men of that other "Greatest Generation" to reflect on their youth and share their stories for posterity (as living memories faded and their numbers rapidly dwindled), there was also a practical consideration served by these memoirs In 1818, Congress enacted the first pension act for Revolutionary War veterans that provided benefits for those who had not been disabled by their service. Further legislation required that applicants demonstrate that their financial circumstances required relief, and in 1828 another service pension act granted full pay for life to those officers and men who had served to the end of the war. Applicants were required to provide a narrative of their service and any further evidence they could provide in support of these claims. Memoirs like those of Ogden, Martin, Becker and Polhemus arose contemporaneously with this legislation.
Historians and genealogists alike find these Revolutionary reminiscences a trove of detailed anecdotes. Martin in particular has become the Patriot "everyman", with a wry and engaging style rich in description and ideally suited for "color commentary." There are far fewer accounts written by common soldiers from the Revolution - be they Loyalist, Patriot, Hessian or Briton - and even those written by officers like Ogden and Polhemus are often the only eyewitness accounts available for certain events and subject matter. They should be approached with caution, however, and not treated as authoritative without question.
A veteran writing more than half a century after Revolution had the opportunity to forget and reinterpret events both intentionally and subconsciously. He may have read other accounts and later histories and highlighted his experiences within that narrative. Thus Aaron Ogden claimed that he was dispatched by Washington under flag of truce to see whether Sir Henry Clinton would exchange the traitor Arnold for the captive Andre, and John Polhemus placed himself close enough to Lafayette at Brandywine when the young Marquis was wounded to joke with him about it being "bon for American liberty." These may, in fact, be strictly factual recollections, but they also served to burnish the reputations of the tellers in close association with notable figures in the Independence struggle. If a pension were on the line, such claims were also golden opportunities, and by the time they were written many other potential eye-witnesses were no longer alive.
John Polhemus made a number of claims in his memoir, written in the mid 1820s in his 87th year, that are difficult to substantiate. He lived just a few short miles from Princeton, so it is conceivable that he could have accompanied the militia to Newtown, PA prior to the attack on Trenton, or been left behind at Princeton to bury the dead. It is harder to credit how he could have been "with General Wayne's expedition and unfortunate surprise by the enemy at Paoli."
The New Jersey Brigade was not posted with Wayne, nor yet within a reasonable distance of his encampment to have been engaged even in part when Wayne was assaulted in a night bayonet attack on September 20, 1777. Instead it was on the other side of the Schuylkill River with Washington's main force and marching further away from Wayne's position. According to Thomas J McGuire, author of the only book length study of this engagement, Wayne's force included the two Pennsylvania brigades of his division; three troops of light dragoons from Virginia and Connecticut regiments; Captain Thomas Randall's Independent Company of Artillery (with men who may have been either from Massachusetts of New Jersey); and civilian teamsters with a number of commissary and quartermaster's department wagons. Unless he was acting as a courier (and as Captain of the 4th company of the 1st New Jersey this is unlikely), it is unclear how he would have been present with Wayne for this celebrated massacre.
The most perplexing part of the Polhemus story, however, has a direct impact of the court martial proceedings of Col. Matthias Ogden in 1779. Washington's instructions on February 24, 1779 to Brigadier General Maxwell of the New Jersey Brigade regarding witnesses named to give evidence included a summons for Captain Polhemus. This presents a problem, because according to his own testimony late in life - both in his memoir and in his Revolutionary war claims before Congress - Polhemus would not have been available to appear at Ogden's trial. He was a prisoner of war.
According to an extensive excerpt from his memoir, while engaged in service near Amboy;
"I was taken prisoner by a large party of Tories...I was sent to the New York gaol, there suffering terribly from want of food and clothing, and obliged to lie on the cold floor, almost perishing, without any hope of relief...It was indeed a most dismal and severe winter. The bay and East and North rivers were frozen over and formed solid bridges of ice, great numbers constantly crossing from New York to Staten Island and Paulus Hook...During this severe and cold weather I was removed to the Sugar House...It was out of the frying pan, into the fire - no fire, not even a blanket to keep me warm...In the Spring of 1780 I was let out on parole, by the intercession of Dr. Bainbridge, father of the future commodore, United States Navy...I went immediately to my regiment, crippled and twisted with rheumatism and in bad health, then to my home where I remained, never receiving notice of my exchange until peace was declared."
From his description of a single, extremely cold winter spent first in the Provost Jail and then the equally notorious Sugar House, and his release in the Spring of 1780, it would seem that Captain Polhemus might have been captured sometime in 1779. Yet in his Revolutionary War claim to Congress in 1832 under the service pension act of 1828, he made the following account of his service that conflicts with his memoirs in key respects;
"...he was in the battles of Trenton, Princeton, Brandywine, Germantown, and Monmouth; that he was afterwards captured by the British and conveyed to New York, where he was detained a prisoner for seventeen months, enduring privations scarcely to be imagined; that in the Spring of the year 1780, he was released upon parole, and continued in the service to the close of the war."
For John Polhemus to have been a prisoner for seventeen months and be released in the Spring of 1780, the latest he could have been captured was January, 1779: more than a month before he was summoned to appear at Ogden's court martial. The only record I have found of a John Polhemus captured in New Jersey between the Battle of Monmouth and January 1779 comes from a Loyalist raid in which Captain Voorhees of the 1st New Jersey was killed by Lt. Col. Simcoe's Queens Rangers and "Dr. Ryker and Mr. John Polhemus were taken prisoners by Major Armstrong's covering party." This raid did indeed occur in the vicinity of Amboy, but took place in October, 1779.
If "Mr. John Polhemus" captured at this time refers to John Polhemus of the 1st New Jersey, then he would have been available for Ogden's trial the previous March, but could not have served more than 9 months in prison - not seventeen - and still be released "in the Spring of 1780 as he claimed.
Furthermore, if he were a serving officer at the time of Simcoe's raid, why is the captured John Polhemus referred to only by his civilian title? Why was he imprisoned in the Provost Jail and the Sugar House, instead of given the opportunity to secure private lodgings on Long Island or elsewhere in the city as was common with other captured officers (as indeed was the case when Matthias Ogden himself was captured in November of 1780)? Why is there no mention in his accounts or any other record of his participation with the New Jersey Brigade in Sullivan's expedition against the Iroquois during the summer and fall of 1779?
When John Polhemus made his case to Congress for full pay for life based on service to the end of the war he also tried to get reimbursed for personal outlays made in the 1st and 2nd establishments of the 1st New Jersey to outfit his company, and for his back pay while a prisoner. In neither of these latter claims was he successful. He asserted that he had once possessed a certificate prepared in 1786 by his old commander Colonel Ogden and by Henry Knox - commander in chief of the all but disbanded United States Army - that stated he was owed $1,500 dollars, but that it had regretably been lost.
Congress found that he had been making claims to the New Jersey legislature based on this amount since 1792, but that the only time it had acted on his request was to deny it. Nor did the committee find he was entitled to any arrears in pay, much as it commended him as without a doubt a "highly meritorious officer." It did confirm that as one who served to the end of the war, he was entitled to his pension. But two years later, it had reason to question even that.
In 1834, the United States Senate took up "An Act for the Relief of John Polhemus" that had been referred from the House of Representatives. There was considerable question as to whether Polhemus had, in fact, served to the end of the war and was entitled to the pension he had secured under the act of 1828. Included with the Senate proceedings were 2 letters which must have been devastating for hopes of keeping the pension, for they seem fairly conclusively to state that he was a declared supernumerary officer under the resolves of 1778, and listed as such on November 1st 1779.
This would explain why John Polhemus might have been considered a civilian when captured at Rahway and had to endure many months in the more notorious prisons in New York before his parole (but not exchange). It would explain why he was not in command of a company during Sullivan's Expedition later in 1779. It strongly suggests that he was taken during Simcoe's raid, and so he would have been able to testify as a supernumerary officer (though apparently not on active service) at Ogden's trial. His claim of 17 months imprisonment is very specific but was only made in his pension claim, and would have covered the gap in his resume - his year as a supernumerary off active service - as well as 5 or so months in prison.
He is recorded by both Heitman and Stryker as having resigned by January 1, 1781, and not as serving to the end of the war. We can forgive an old soldier for trying to put his excellent service record through Monmouth in the best light to conform to the requirements of government bureaucracy. Officialdom has routinely treated servicemen (and women) scandalously throughout America's wars regarding veterans benefits. He outlived nearly all of his contemporaries, but even his faded tombstone does not fit comfortably with the historic record. He died on May 25, 1833 in his ninety-sixth year, while it took the Senate until the following year to consider and then find evidence against a bill for his relief.
The 1st New Jersey Continental Battalion in its first establishment was raised in East Jersey. The Jerseys, East and West, had distinct colonial and cultural histories dating from the late 17th Century when they were administered as separate provinces. With an overall population of about 120,000 at the time of the Revolution, the Jerseys were remarkably diverse, but expressed quite differently between and within each region.
West Jersey was Quaker dominated and, as with today, economically oriented toward Philadelphia. Within East Jersey were ethnic communities as diverse as Dutch speaking, Calvinist Bergen and Somerset counties, Anglican Perth Amboy and Puritan Newark. There were mixed areas of Scots and Scots- Irish, as well as the majority of the free and enslaved African American population (about 7% or so of the total population of the state).
Elizabethtown in East Jersey was the oldest English settlement in the Jerseys, and right from the start a thorn in the side of the governing Anglican proprietors. Although the provincial capital was established at Perth Amboy - and during the Revolution remained a bastion of Loyalism - Elizabethtown was in many respects the social and economic center of East Jersey and home to a number of "Gentlemen of the first rank in Dignity and Quality."
It was settled by Long Island Puritans, and among the very first of these were John Ogden and his five sons. Col. Matthias Ogden and his brother Aaron Ogden descended from John Ogden and were the fifth generation of their family to reside in Elizabethtown, Because of its proximity to Manhattan, Elizabethtown was a prosperous economic center and the residence of those like William Livingston with extensive New York social ties and economic interests.
The Ogdens, while not possessing great wealth like the Livingstons, nonetheless represented a prominent local elite as prosperous freeholders and members of a long established family with considerable political and professional interests. Robert Ogden (1716-1787), the father of Matthias and Aaron, was among the foremost lawyers in the Jerseys and had been Speaker of the House of the Provincial Assembly during the Stamp Act crisis. This was his political downfall, as he chose not to sign the resolves of the Stamp Act Congress to which he was a delegate, preferring to have each colony send its protest to the Crown under separate cover. He was vilified in New Jersey and even hanged in effigy, but by the time of the Revolution his reputation had been to some degree rehabilitated. Whatever the sins of the father in the eyes of the state's radical revolutionaries, they do not appear to have been visited on his hotheaded patriot sons.
The Ogdens were members of Elizabethtown's 1st Presbyterian Church, a hotbed of independent spirit since the Great Awakening. This church claimed at least 39 parishioners who served as patriot officers during the revolution, including both Ogdens and their kinsmen through marriage Lt. Col. Francis Barber, Col. Oliver Spenser, and Colonel Elias Dayton and his son Jonathan Dayton (who was later the youngest Signer of the Constitution). Together these men either held top command of three of the five continental regiments raised in New Jersey during the war or would hold important staff positions at the Division level under General Sullivan. Governor Livingston was also a fellow parishioner, yet in 1779 there was only one other officer from the Parrish in the 1st New Jersey besides the Ogdens (Cyrus D'Hart).
The Ogdens, Daytons and their allies represented a powerful block within the command structure of the New Jersey Brigade, but at the outset there were other officers with other backgrounds besides the Elizabethans who were eventually supplanted by the upstart Matthias Ogden. In September of 1775, while Matthias was trudging through the Maine wilderness toward Quebec with Benedict Arnold, Morris County New Jersey nominated officers for its quota of six companies of minutemen. A meeting moderated by William D'Hart of Morristown recommended William Winds as Colonel and D'Hart as Lt. Colonel. Upon the call by Congress the following month for two battalions of Continental troops from New Jersey, the eastern battalion drew heavily from these minute companies and retained Winds as Lt. Colonel and D'Hart as its Major. William Alexander (Lord Sterling) was its first commander.
On March, 7th 1776, Congress promoted Winds to Colonel of the regiment and appointed Matthias Ogden, just returned from Quebec, as Lt. Colonel. Winds protested Ogden's appointment as his second in command on behalf of the regiment in a letter to John Hancock the following week, adding he hoped "this young gentleman's merits might be rewarded in some other way." Winds had further difficulties with his officers that year in the Northern Department, and the young and ambitious Ogden was himself critical of the way things were being managed by his Colonel. Nor did Col. Dayton of the 3rd NJ have much use for Colonel Winds, and he was forced out in the 2nd establishment of the regiment in favor of Silas Newcomb and went on to serve in the militia. Newcomb was promoted to general a few weeks later, leaving Matthias Ogden as Colonel by January 1, 1777. Maj. D'Hart quickly found a post as Lt. Colonel in the 2nd New Jersey and the transfer of power in the 1st Battalion from Morris County to Elizabethtown was complete/
Aside from generational and patronage issues, the social hierarchy within the officer corps of the 1st New Jersey is worth close examination as we consider the charges brought by some of his subordinates against Colonel Ogden at his court martial in March, 1779. Of those named as witnesses in support of the charges, Captain Isaac Morrison's conflicts with the social elite of Elizabethtown has already been established. What other the others?
"...I therefore presume ('tho undistinguished and unknown to your Board) to offer myself a candidate, earnestly entreating your favour & encouragement. Being bred to the Sea almost from my Infancy, I confess I am ignorant and inexperienced in the Art of War, having never been in actual service, but as I fear that is too generally the case with the Inhabitants of this Province, I hope that consideration alone, will not exclude me from your notice."
Patriotic zeal and initiative were enough to secure him his Captaincy, and after being wounded at Germantown Conway found further advancement in other New Jersey battalions. Conway was not finished with the 1st New Jersey, however, and would serve under Ogden again. At the time of the trial, though, he had recently transferred from the disbanded 4th Battalion to Col. Dayton's 3rd NJ as its Major.
Unsettled questions of officer seniority rankled in Washington's army during the winter of 1778-1779. It was not simply a matter of injured pride and self importance. There had been few vacancies caused in battle since the Philadelphia Campaign of 1777-1778, and therefore few opportunities to advance within the same regiment. Seniority mattered in such cases, yet there were inconsistencies in the dates of commissions. Some commissions seem to have carried forward with the original date while other officers were reappointed with a later one.
According to Heitman, this was the case for then 1st Lieutenant Isaac Morrison of the 1st New Jersey, whose commission terminated on November 10th, 1776 until his reappointment with the same rank on November 20th, 1776 in the 2nd establishment of the battalion. His brother officer John Van Angeln had his lieutenancy terminated on November 20th, 1776 until his reappointment on November 29th of that year. Morrison, it will be recalled from prior posts in this series, brought his commander Col. Matthias Ogden up on court martial charges during this period of heightened sensitivity to rank and seniority, and Van Anglen was called as a supporting witness.
The difference in dates mattered because seniority was not only the basis for preferment but also came into play when regiments were reduced or combined and surplus officers declared supernumerary. Reorganization of the Continental battalions was in the wind that winter, and in fact Congress declared in March, 1779 that it only required three of New Jersey's four regiments as that state's quota in the coming year. Consequently, the 4th New Jersey battalion under Col. Ephraim Martin was disbanded.
Even before reaching that decision - one based on the inability to support at its current size a standing army that had been engaged for three years service - Congress was well aware of the confusion created by the lack of any consistent standard for determining relative rank among the various branches of services and battalions of the different states. On November 24th, 1778, Congress passed a number of resolutions in an effort to provide uniformity. As is often the case with bureaucracies, the legislation only served to make an already confused situation more contentious:
" 1. For determining rank in the continental line between all colonels and inferior officers of different states, between like officers of infantry and those of horse and artillery, appointed under the authority of Congress, by virtue of a resolve of the 16 September, 1776, or by virtue of any
subsequent resolution prior to the 1 January, 1777; all such officers shall be deemed to have their commissions dated on the day last mentioned and their relative rank with respect to each other, in the continental line of the army shall be determined by their rank prior to the 16 day of September, 1776. This rule shall not be considered to affect the rank of the line within any State or within the corps of artillery, horse, or among the sixteen additional battalions, where the rank hath been settled; but shall be the rule to determine the relative rank within the particular line of artillery so far as the rank remains unsettled. 2. In the second instance preference shall be given to commissions in the new levies and flying camp.
3. In determining rank between continental officers, in other respects equal, proper respect shall be had to their commissions in the militia, where they have served in the continental army for the space of one month.
4. All colonels and inferior officers appointed to vacancies since the 5th day of January 1777, shall take rank from the right of succession to such vacancies.
5. In all cases where the rank between two officers of different states is equal, between an officer of state troops and one of cavalry, artillery, or of the additional battalions, the precedence is to be determined by lot.
6. All officers who have been prisoners with the enemy, being appointed by their State, and again enter into the service, shall do it agreeably to the above rule, that is to say: All of the rank of captain, and under, shall enter into the same regiment to which they formerly belonged; and if the Regiment is dissolved or otherwise reduced, they shall be intitled (sic) to the first vacancy in any regiment of the State in their proper rank, after the officers belonging to such regiment have been provided for.
7. The rules of rank above laid down between officers of different states, are to govern between officers of the same State, except in cases where the State may have laid down a different rule or already settled their rank."
There was a good deal more in this line, but the result was that officers who were already feeling unsupported by their respective states in their material wants had even more cause for resentment when attempting to establish their relative seniority based on dates of commission. On February 7th, 1779, Washington wrote to William Maxwell, the commander of the New Jersey Brigade, attaching a report from a Congressional committee with its understanding of the dates of commissions in the New Jersey Line:
"Inclosed (sic) you have a copy of the arrangement of the New Jersey Regiments as made out by the committee of arrangement appointed by Congress. You will observe that all the officers, subordinate to a Major have the respective dates oftheir commissions regularly ascertained, but that the dates of the superior officers are left open. In case the relative rank of these officers cannot be amicably settled among themselves, it will be proper to have their claims discussed by a board of field officers, or, such as are totally disinterested in the matter. As Colonel Martin has declined the service it may make the arrangement easier should it be found necessary to recur to the determination of a board of field or General officers."
If Washington held out hope that this matter would indeed be resolved amicably, his confidence was sadly misplaced. Two weeks later, in the very letter in which he informes Maxwell that colonel Matthias Ogden would stand before a court martial for "charges of a very high nature", he acknowledges receipt of a conflicting report regarding the seniority of 15 officers in the Brigade that had been transmitted to him by Col. Ogden.
The conflict over seniority affected the lower ranks of the officer corps as well as senior commanders. Resentment boiled over on February 2nd, 1779 in the 1st New Jersey with the appointment to Captain of Aaron Ogden, the younger brother of its Colonel Matthias Ogden (and my direct ancestor). Aaron Ogden had a long record of service with the regiment. He held a lieutenant's commission dating from November 29th, 1776, but had been regimental paymaster from December, 1775 in the first establishment until he resigned that post. Heitman gives the date of this resignation as February 1, 1779, but Stryker says he resigned as paymaster on April 1st, 1778. Stryker also says that he was appointed Captain-Lieutenant, the senior lieutenant commanding the "Colonel's Company", but gives no date for this commission. Another source indicates that his promotion to Captain-Lieutenant came in January, 1779.
Furthermore, Aaron Ogden was addressed as "Major" following his appointment as Brigade Major in March, 1778 on Maxwell's staff, where he also acted as Aide de Camp. As a staff officer at the brigade level he was no longer a line commander, but his promotion to Captain in his brother's battalion at a time when tensions over seniority were high and there was every likelihood that others would soon be declared supernumerary was too much for some of the other officers in the regiment to bear.
In April, 1779, just after the conclusion of the court martial of Colonel Matthias Ogden, at least two Lieutenants made a formal complaint to General Washington that their seniority had been disregarded and they had been "injured in rank" by the promotions of Aaron Ogden and the man who succeeded him as Captain-Lieutenant in the 1st New Jersey. One of these petitioners, Lt. Jonathan Snowden of the 1st New Jersey, appears to have felt so aggrieved that "he had reason to consider himself exempted from duty 'till his claim of rank was settled." His commanders did not agree, and he was brought before a brigade court martial on charges of "disobedience of orders and neglect of duty." Although Snowden was acquitted of the charges, Washington took issue with the findings in his General Orders of April 14th, 1779:
"The General is sorry he cannot agree with the Court in opinion: General Maxwell's reply related by Captain Voorhees is susceptible of different interpretations and it appears by Ensign Bishop's evidence that Lieutenant Snowden did not found his refusal to do duty upon General Maxwell's exemption, but declared that " He intended to exempt himself "; Lieutent. Snowden's conceiving himself agrieved (sic)in rank was no justification for disobeying a regular order and refusing his tour of duty: He should have represented his case and applied for redress to the Commander in Chief and in the mean time continued to perform the duties of his station."
All of these matters of rank arose in the months and weeks prior and subsequent to the court martial of Colonel Matthias Ogden on charges of misconduct brought forward and supported by several of his officers. Whether his younger brother received preferential treatment or advanced on his own merits was certainly cause for resentment, though in fairness to my ancestor he served with evident distinction. But were other factors at work besides inconsistencies in dates of commission and suspicion of nepotism? Was there a geographic and social hierarchy within the officer corps of the 1st New Jersey? We shall examine this hypothesis in the next post in this series.
No less than three of his eight company commanders and two of his former officers were called as witnesses against Colonel Matthias Ogden at his 1779 court martial. Clearly Captain Isaac Morrison who proffered the charges had specific grievances against his commander. The second charge in particular accuses Colonel Ogden of " Repeated frauds against the Public and also the officers and soldiers under his command." Perhaps some of the others named as witnesses felt the same; Captain John Polhemus would later make unsuccessful claims for restitution of funds he said had been personally expended to outfit his company with the expectation of reimbursement.
The New Jersey continentals, along with the rest of Washington's army, were chronically beset by shortages of supplies, and it was not until March, 1780 that they received sufficient uniforms of good quality in a shipment from France. In light of this situation, it is interesting to note that Assistant Quartermaster Robert Kelso was called to testify at Ogden's trial. Washington's letter of instruction only gives the military titles of the Continental officers involved in the case, so it is not clear whether Kelso gave evidence relating to his official quartermaster duties or as an incidental witness to one or more of the charges.
The New Jersey Line was also short of soldiers. The New Jersey continental battalions seldom approached an effective strength of even 200 officers and men. It turns out that Ogden's accuser Captain Morrison was himself arrested and brought before a Court Martial the previous year at Valley Forge for:
"selling as Substitutes, men who by an express law of the State, were deemed incapable of being such and for selling soldiers as Substitutes who were before inlisted (sic) for the common bounty. Upon consideration of the Charges and Evidence the Court are unanimously of opinion that Captain Morrison is guilty of the charges exhibited against him, but as he does not appear to have been actuated by self interested motives, as his actions which are most censured, have arose from a desire of promoting the good of the service, the Court determine mine that he does not merit Censure."
Washington approved the findings in his General Orders of May 11, 1778, but felt compelled to add that he
"cannot forbear remarking that the practice of selling soldiers as substitutes is an abuse of the highest nature and pregnant with the most pernicious Consequences, though there is every reason to hope in the present instance that it did not proceed from selfish and pecuniary motives, yet it is in itself of so dangerous a tendency and so inconsistent with every rule of Propriety that it cannot but merit reprehension. Captn. Morrison is released from his Arrest."
Given that two other officers were cashiered by this same court martial for other offenses, Captain Morrison was fortunate to be treated so leniently. Whether this experience added to a feeling of being ill-used by his superiors can only be speculated, but the feisty Morrison was more than willing to challenge abuse of power as he perceived it.
As shall be seen, the officers of the New Jersey Line were deeply divided over their relative seniority, especially in March 1779 when Congress reduced New Jersey's quota from four continental battalions to three, making a number of officers supernumeraries. They were wholeheartedly in agreement, however, that their compensation was woefully inadequate and had failed to keep pace with spiraling inflation.
A letter to the New Jersey Legislature in April, 1779 signed by more than 50 officers of the New Jersey Brigade bluntly states:
" four months pay of a private will not procure his wretched wife and children a single bushel of wheat. The situation of your officers is worse. The pay of a Colonel of your regiments will not purchase the oats for his horse, nor will his whole day's pay procure him a single dinner. A common laborer or an express rider receives for times a s much as he."
Both Col. Matthias Ogden and his brother Captain Aaron Ogden signed this letter, sent barely two weeks after the findings of the Ogden court martial were announced in General Orders. Rather tellingly, among the 21 signatories from the officers of the 1st New Jersey are found every other captain except the three called as witnesses to the charges against Colonel Ogden. Nor did Ensign Asher Levy sign the letter. However, both Lt. Col. William D'Hart and Major John Conway in their respective regiments added their names to the petition.
All was clearly not well in the officer corps in Washington's Army, and particularly in the Jersey Brigade. We will look more closely at the question of seniority, who was passed over in the 1st New Jersey and who received preference, in a subsequent post in this series.
General Washington sent the following instructions to Brigadier General William Maxwell on February 24, 1779 regarding the upcoming trial of my ancestor Colonel Matthias Ogden, who was one of Maxwell's regimental commanders in the Jersey Brigade.
Tuesday next is appointed for a Court Martial to sit at this place for the trial of Colo. Ogden on the charges exhibited by Capt. Morrison. I have given the Colo. notice and I must desire you to summon Capt. Morrison, and Colo. De Hart, Capt. Polhemus, Capt. Van Angel, Major Conway, Ensign Levy, Mr. Mathias Williamson and Robt. Kelso, who were returned as evidence to support the charges.
While I have been unable to locate a transcript of the court proceedings (assuming that one even survives), it is possible to discern much - and surmise more - about these named individuals who were called as witnesses for the prosecution. Evidently they were identified by Captain Morrison in his formal charges against Colonel Ogden, but the extent to which they were involved in the decision to bring them to Washington's attention is unclear.
This is a fascinating list. It includes a number of officers who were then serving under Ogden in the 1st New Jersey battalion (2nd establishment): Captains Isaac Morrison, John Polhemus and John Van Angeln and Ensign Asher Levy. Two more were formerly of the regiment: Lt. Colonel William D'Hart and Major John Conway. It also includes Mathias Williamson, formerly a Brigadier General who commanded the New Jersey militia in 1776 (and who coincidentally is a direct ancestor of mine, though no
relation of Ogden's at the time), and Robert Kelso, an assistant
quartermaster with the quartermaster general's department. I shall have much more to say about these men in subsequent posts, but for now a bit of biographical data on each will suffice.
Captain Isaac Morrison was of Scotch Irish descent. Born in 1745 in Somerset, NJ, he was orphaned before reaching the age of maturity and at 16 was made a ward of John Hill of Elizabethtown, where the Ogden family was well established. He was later embroiled on the losing end of a land dispute with prominent men in Elizabethtown over the status of claims to Newark Mountain, writing his pointed criticisms of the well placed and powerful under the name of Tobias Freedman. His publisher was subsequently obliged to print an apologetic retraction. On the eve of the Revolution. Morrison had reason to resent the upper echelon of Elizabeth society to which Col. Ogden belonged.
Morrison enlisted in the 1st New Jersey Battalion during its first establishment as 1st Lieutenant in the 6th company (McMyer's). His commission was dated December 15th, 1775 and he served until November 10th, 1776 when the regiment was reorganized for its 2nd establishment. Among the others named as witnesses in the Ogden court martial, William D'Hart of Morristown was initially Major in the battalion's 1st establishment, with John Conway as Captain of its 3rd Company, John Polhemus Captain of its 4th and John Van Anglen as Ensign and then 1st Lieutenant in the 4th Company.
Matthias Ogden was not there at the beginning. He was a volunteer acting as captain of a Grenadier company with Benedict Arnold in Canada and subsequently Brigade Major, but his brother Aaron was paymaster of the 1st New Jersey. When Matthias Ogden was promoted by Congress in March, 1776 to Lt. Col. and appointed to the 1st NJ, it may well have frustrated the ambition of Major D'Hart. This officer remained as Major for only a brief time in the 2nd establishment before transferring to the 2nd New Jersey as its Lt. Colonel. As will be seen, some of the under officers of the 1st New Jersey resented the preferential treatment they felt was shown to Aaron Ogden in his subsequent promotions.
Sensitivities about the seniority of commissions was rampant throughout Washington's Army, but especially following the reorganization of the continental regiments for three years service in 1777. There were a number of changes in the second establishment of the 1st New Jersey, Heitman's Historical Register of the Officers of the Continental Army gives the following dates and commissions in the 2nd establishment for the officers named in the court martial of Matthias Ogden:
The 1st New Jersey saw hard service in 1777. As part of the division of William Alexander (Lord Sterling), it fought in the Battle of Hills prior to the Philadelphia Campaign. When General Maxwell was on temporary leave commanding a hastily formed light infantry corps, the senior Colonel (yet another ancestor) Elias Dayton commanded the New Jersey Brigade at Brandywine. Here the 1st New Jersey stood against the British Grenadiers and Light Infantry on the Plowed Hill. At Germantown the 1st and 3rd New Jersey (Ogden and Dayton's regiments) assaulted the Chew House "Cliveden" and took heavy casualties. Col. Dayton recorded:
"At this place fell Capt. McMyer and Ensign Hurley of Col. Ogden's regiment; Capt. Conway, Capt. Morrison; Capt. Baldwin and Lt. Robinson, wounded, of the same regiment, together with 20 men...my horse was shot out from under me, at the same place, within about three yards of the corner of the house."
Captain Polhemus would later write at a very advanced age that "all the captains of the 1st Battalion were killed and wounded but myself, and I did Major's duty." Given Dayton's account of the officer casualties in the 1st New Jersey this claim is not wide of the mark, but there is much else in the Polhemus memoir that does not stand up to scrutiny. This, too, shall be examined in a subsequent post.
These then, were then men named by Captain Isaac Morrison as witnesses to the charges of general neglect of duty, fraud, cowardice and gaming brought against Colonel Ogden in the later winter of 1779. Much had transpired since the Philadelphia campaign, and the New Jersey battalions were no longer the crack shock troops of 1777. We shall examine the condition of the regiment and the tensions of front line service in winter in their own backyards in the next post in this series.
