Walking the Berkshires

"After consulting those gentlemen (in whom you could confide) who were best acquainted with the island"; Sullivan's Staten Island Raid (Part III)

There were just two Continental infantry regiments and some New Jersey militia on the front lines in August of 1777 to defend against loyalist raids from Staten Island.  Col. Elias Dayton's 3rd NJ was posted near Newark and and Col. Matthias Ogden's regiment at Elizabethtown.  In As We Were - The Story of Old Elizabethtown, historian Theodore Thayer draws from an account published in a Loyalist newspaper to observe;

"Together Dayton and Ogden had but 400 men, badly clothed and nearly all barefoot." 

These troops had been blooded at Short Hills, New Jersey in the end of June, and had been on the march for much of the time since then.

Elizabethtown was home ground for Matthias Ogden and a fair number of the officers and men in the 1st NJ Continental regiment.  Some of their Tory townsmen had since withdrawn to Staten Island, where a brigade of New Jersey loyalist volunteers under Brigadier Cortland Skinner formed the core of the Island's garrison after General Howe's main army put to sea. 

The New Jersey loyalist volunteer battalions began recruiting in the last months of 1776, but as with their patriot adversaries, none was at full strength in the summer of 1777.  Altogether, the New Jersey loyalist battalions could field fewer than 900 men.  They had been involved in actions in New Jersey since the Forage War that winter and early spring. The latest of these occurred  on August 19th, as Lt. Col. Edward Vaughan Dongan and Major Robert Drummond of the 3rd Battalion NJV made a raid from Staten Island far inland with about sixty men, and brought off livestock and prisoners in the face of the Elizabethtown Light Horse under a certain Major Barnett. 

Col. Dongan was the scion of an old Staten Island family and had a wife and young son at home.  According to Morris' history of Staten Island, his battalion was posted on the Morning Star Road "about midway between the shore and Graniteville", His true position was probably south of the heights that bisect the Island not far from the village of Richmond, a place known locally as Cuckoldstown, itself a corruption of Cocclestown, so called because of the abundance of oysters available in the nearby Fresh Kills salt marsh.

As I have depicted them on the map  at left, the other loyalist battalions were positioned at intervals from Decker's Ferry on the north shore where the 4th NJV were billeted under their Lt. Colonel Abraham van Buskirk, to the Amboy Road near Billop's House at the southwest extremity  of the Island which was assigned to Lt. Colonel Allen's deleted 6th NJV battalion.  The 1st NJV were at Old Blazing Star Ferry under Lt. Col. Lawrence and the 5th at New Blazing Star Ferry under Lt. Colonel Barton, but apparently no one was posted opposite Halsted's Point, the customary crossing from Elizabethtown, an omission in the Island's defensive screen which would prove very costly in the days to come. 

The remaining Crown Forces on the Island consisted of the British 52nd regiment of Foot under Lt. Col. Campbell, posted near van Buskirk's Battalion, and two German regiments.  The 3rd English-Waldeck Regiment was the only battalion provided by Prince Friedrich Karl August Fürst zu Waldeck und Pyrmont to fight in America under contract with the British King.  The Waldeckers had initially been garrisoned in occupied Elizabethtown before events at Trenton and Princeton compelled them to withdraw. The other German unit was the 2nd Anspach-Bayreuth regiment which had only just arrived in America that June.  Both German units were billeted near "the Watering Place" in the Northeast corner of the Island, and the entire garrison was under the command of Brigadier General John Campbell, late of the 37th Regiment of foot.

Reasonably accurate details of the disposition of these forces informed the plan of attack which resulted in Sullivan's Staten Island Raid.  The person with the immediate responsibility for monitoring activity on the Island and gathering information about troop strength and deployment was the commander of the 1st NJ Continentals based in Elizabethtown, Col. Matthias Ogden.  He did not, however, report directly to Major General Sullivan, whose division was posted some 20 miles away in the interior of the State.  Rather, he and Colonel Elias Dayton had been detatched from Maxwell's NJ Brigade, while their sister regiments remained with Washington's main army.  As for Maxwell, as senior Brigadier he was soon to be given a temporary command of a corps of Light Infantry to replace those riflemen under Daniel Morgan who were sent to reinforce the northern army.  Elias Dayton was senior to Ogden, and Washington corresponded directly with him while the two regiments were stationed at Elizabethtown and Newark.  Nonetheless, it was Matthias Ogden, and not Dayton, who would command the NJ Continentals for Sullivan's Raid.  Whether Dayton absented himself from the enterprise or was otherwise unable to participate, it is worth noting that the honor of a detached command during the raid was given to Ogden.

Local histories would later assign credit to Ogden for bringing the idea for a raid on Staten Island to Sullivan's attention. "Colonel Ogden, an ardent patriot, always anxious for a fight, had no difficulty in convincing Sullivan that if the project was property undertaken, success was reasonably assured."  Both of these men were ambitious and eager for independent action, yet Ogden was assiduous in his later testimony in giving Sullivan full credit for ordering the plan of attack "after consulting those gentlemen (in whom you could confide) who were best acquainted with the Island."  By then Sullivan's actions were the subject of a court martial, and Ogden was certainly sensitive to the possibility that he might be called to account for his own actions.  Still, despite the ab sense of conclusive documentation, it seems quite probable that Matthias Ogden was among "those gentleman" who provided confidential information to Sullivan and informed his decision to attack.

Sullivan appears to have been prepared to seize the opportunity to strike a blow against the Staten Island garrison on the heels of Lt. Col. Dongan's successful foray into NJ on August 18th.   Sullivan's A.D.C. Major Sherburne later testified that the day after this loyalist incursion, the General gave orders for the two brigades of his division to prepare to march at noon on the 20th with two day's provisions.  Sherburne concluded that Sullivan's commanders were told the true reason for this march by Sullivan at this time.   Sherburne also testified that a Captain Barnett with a party of the Lt. Infantry from Hazen's regiment was assigned a special mission in the plan of attack.  There is no record of a Captain Barnett in Sullivan's division or in ogden's command, but there was Major William Barnett, jr. of the local light horse who had been just been humiliated by Dongan.  Quite possibly he was another of those gentlemen in whom Sullivan could confide.  Whether the advice they provided would bear fruit or not will be the subject of subsequent posts in this series.

 

 

 

 

My Feb 17th Nature's Notebook Column in the LJ

Those of you who prefer the ecological over the historic offerings at Walking the Berkshire may enjoy a helping of each in my latest Nature's Notebook column in the Lakeville Journal, readable here with free registration.  Fair use excerpt:

"As a Revolutionary War reenactor who has been known to stand out in the snow in cocked hat and buckled shoes, I am deeply grateful that I do not have to endure the conditions experienced in 1780 by Private Martin and the ragged Continentals at Morristown.

As a naturalist, I know that the bit of birch bark Martin resorted to chewing may not have curbed his hunger, but eating enough of it might have helped him ward off scurvy."

"Injuries done by your Division [are] of greater amount, than by the whole Army": Sullivan's Staten Island Raid (Part II)

With General Howe's Royalist army last seen heading out to sea from the Capes of the Delaware, Washington continued to shuffle the various elements of his command to monitor the Crown forces that remained in New York and on Staten Island, while attending to known threats from Burgoyne in the North and to the possibility that Howe's real objective was Philadelphia. 

One of Washington's divisions under Major General John Sullivan spent the last days of July and the first week of August marching between the Hudson Highlands and Morristown, New Jersey. This division consisted of the first Maryland Brigade, assigned to Brigadier General William Smallwood, and the 2nd Maryland Brigade under Brigadier General Preudhomme DeBorre. As it would soon play a major part in Sullivan's Staten Island Raid later that month, it is worth considering the composition and qualities of this Division and its commanders as we set the stage for that action.

John Sullivan was ambitious and eager for advancement.  While serving as one of New Hampshire's delegates to Congress, he secured appointment as Brigadier General. He lead a relief expedition to Canada early in 1776 that ended with the retreat of the American forces to Lake Champlain.  Sullivan hoped for field command of the Northern Army, but Congress passed him over in favor of Horatio Gates.    Washington provided his own candid assessment of Sullivan in a letter to Congress:

"I think it is my duty to observe...that he is active, spiritied, and Zealously attach'd to the Cause; that he does not want Abilities, many Members of Congress, including myself, can testify. But he has his wants, and he has his foibles.  The latter are manifested in a little tincture of vanity, and in an over desire of being popular, which now and then leads him into some embarrassments."

Appointed Major General on August 9th, 1776, Sullivan was new to his command and in the confusion of the Battle of Long Island a few weeks later he was captured after fended off his attackers with a pistol in each hand.  Soon paroled, Sullivan was exchanged in time for the attacks on Trenton and Princeton where he performed well. 

Congress authorized three year enlistments for Continental regiments in the new establishment, but as the 1777 campaign season advanced, many of these battalions were still greatly understrength. Maryland's quota was 8 battalions and it eventually fielded 7, but it was hard going.

On paper, the 1st Brigade of Sullivan's Division consisted of the 1st, 3rd, 5th and 6th Maryland regiments  and the Delaware regiment, but a fair number of its senior officers, including Brig. Gen. Smallwood and Col. Mordecai Gist of the 3rd Maryland, were absent from their commands on recruiting duty.   Smallwood had been the Colonel of the original Maryland regiment that fought a gallant rearguard action during the Battle of Long Island, and he was also a veteran of Trenton and Princeton. 

When General Smallwood did join his command, he was concerned that while his was the senior Maryland brigade, the other was numerically superior.  Washington wrote to him on August 20th, 1777, taking pains to explain;

"In arranging the Army at the commencement of the Campaign, I endeavoured to make the Brigades, as equal as possible in point of numbers, some have out grown others by the increase of the Strength of particular Regiments, and that is the Reason why Genl. De Borre's exceeds yours, Hazens Regiment having increased considerably."

Philippe Hubert, Chevalier Preudhomme DeBorre was one of the numerous French noblemen who arrived in America having received assurances of high rank in the Continental army from United States agent in France, Silas Deane.  Congress having appointed DeBorre  a Brigadier General in May, 1777, Washington initially informed the Frenchman that his new command would consist of the 2nd, 4th and 6th MD regiments and the German Battalion that had been raised in Maryland and Pennsylvania.  Two days later, Washington's official arrangement of brigades assigned the 7th MD to DeBorre and the 6th to Smallwood. Sometime thereafter, the German Battalion was replaced by Hazen's 2nd Canadian Regiment, which Congress had authorized to recruit in the Middle Colonies and was able to field two battalions.  Hazen remained on recruiting duty during this period, leaving Lt. Col. Edward Anthill in charge of the oversized regiment.

There were difficulties at the outset with this appointment.  DeBorre fell out with fellow Frenchman Thomas Mullens, his first Brigade Major, and requested an American as his replacement.  Washington would have preferred providing a position for one of the many unassigned French volunteers who expected to be accommodated with commissions, but on August 17th, 1777 he  assigned Captain McConnell from Hazen's Regiment to De Borre as Brigade Major.  

DeBorre had his own ideas about military justice as well.  Captain William Beatty of the 7th Maryland Regiment recorded in his diary on July 31st:

"One of the Inhabitants was taken up for assisting some of our Deserters...A Court Martial being immediately ordered for the tryal of the Tory taken up in the Morning...The Court pass'd sentance of death on him, which Gen DeBore ordered to be put in Execution by Hanging the Poor fellow from a Limb of a Sycamore Bush, close on the side of the road."

The status of prisoners taken in arms at this stage of the Revolution was tenuous at best, and Washington was quick to assert the need for proper civilian trials in such cases rather than summary drum head executions. 

"With respect to the Tory, who was tried and executed by your order, though his crime was heinous enough to deserve the fate he met with, and though I am convinced you acted in the affair with a good intention, yet I cannot but wish it had not happened. In the first place, it was a matter that did not come within the jurisdiction of martial law, and therefore the whole proceeding was irregular and illegal, and will have a tendency to excite discontent, jealousy and murmurs among the people. In the Second, if the trial could properly have been made by a Court Martial, as the Division you command is only a detachment from the Army, and you cannot have been considered as in a Separate Department, there is none of our articles of War that will justify your inflicting a Capital punishment, even on a Soldier, much less a Citizen. I mention these things for your future Government, as what is past cannot be recalled. The temper of the Americans and the principles on which the present contest turns, will not countenance proceedings of this nature."

Captain Beatty noted in his diary on July 25th that "the troops were drawn out for the Execution of two Soldiers for House breaking [but] The Men were repreived (sic)."  Plundering was a particular problem for Sullivan's command, and Washington felt compelled to address this matter in a sharply worded admonition to Sullivan:

"It is with no small concern, I am constrained to inform you, that I am constantly receiving Complaints from the People living contiguous to the road, of great abuses committed by the Division under your command in their march thro the Country. From their accounts, they have experienced the most wanton and insufferable injuries. Fences destroyed without the least apparent necessity, and a great number of Horses seized and taken away. In a word, according to them, they have suffered the most flagrant violation of their property. perhaps their representations may be rather exaggerated beyond the bounds of strict truth. But I cannot but observe, that the Officers in the Quarter Master Generals Department have informed me, that more accounts have been presented to them for Injuries done by your Division and of greater amount, than by the whole Army besides, and those carry too a degree of authenticity with them, being certified in many instances under the Officers hands. At the same time, that you are sensible how destressing such a conduct is to the Inhabitants, you well know it is highly disgraceful and unworthy of the cause in which we are engaged. Add to this, that it has a fatal and obvious tendency to prejudice their minds and to disaffect them. I must request, in the most earnest manner, your attention to this matter and to prevent in future, by every exertion in your power, the like proceedings. point out the scandal and impropriety of it to your Officers and urge them, as they regard their honour and reputation, to use their endeavours to restrain such unwarrantable practices."

Here, then, was the situation as Sullivan's Division sat cooling its heels at Hanover, New Jersey, as few miles from Morristown.  The regiments had a core of veterans but were under enrolled and key commanders were absent on recruiting duty.  There were conflicts within General DeBorre's staff and problems with military discipline and with the military's interaction with civilians.  General Sullivan himself was looking for new opportunities to distinguish himself, but had been feeling unwell and was less than attentive to his command.  And twenty miles away was the channel between Elizabeth, NJ and loyalist controlled Staten Island.  Sometime before August 20th, Sullivan turned his attention to this target of opportunity.  Whether he conceived of the idea on his own, or it was presented to him by another ambitious officer from outside his division, is the subject of a subsequent post.

"The Conduct of the Enemy is Distressing and Difficult to be Understood": Sullivan's Staten Island Raid (Part I)

On August 3rd, 1777, George Washington wrote to Col. Elias Dayton, the senior regimental commander in the Jersey Brigade:

"Sir: The conduct of the Enemy is distressing and difficult to be understood. Since my last, directing you to proceed to Peeks Kill, their Fleet, or a pretty considerable part of it, has appeared off the Capes of Delaware, as we were advised yesterday by Express. In this state of uncertainty about their real object and design, I think it advisable, that you should halt your own and Colo. Ogden's Regiments where this Letter reaches you and there remain till further orders from me, unless you should receive authentic intelligence of the Fleets coming within Sandy Hook or going farther to the Eastward; in which case, you will proceed immediately to Peeks Kill, with all the expedition you can. You will hold yourself and every thing in readiness to march on the most Sudden emergency."

Lord Howe's intentions were indeed mystifying, and not only to the American Commander in Chief.  After maneuvering in East Jersey and a sharp fight on June 26th with General Stirling's Division at Short Hills, Howe withdrew to Staten Island. 

There he delayed for several weeks, and much of his army sat miserably on troop ships in Prince's Bay. Howe's Adjutant- General,  Major Stephen Kemble, observed in his journal during this period that he found "from the general tenor of Officers Conversation that they are not well pleased with Affairs, but they speak without thought...and the General is the best judge of his own Actions."

Howe finally put to sea on July 23rd, 1777 with 15,000 men in 260 vessels.   Whether the commander of the Crown forces in North America intended to support Burgoyne's offensive from Canada, or may have had designs on New England, Philadelphia, Charleston or some other objective, was unknown.  Consequently, Washington ordered various Continental troops to march and counter march between the Hudson Highlands and Philadelphia to cover all contingencies, with units like Colonel Dayton and Colonel Ogden's New Jersey regiments given the additional task of monitoring the forces of the Crown that remained in occupied New York and Staten Island.

Washington actually considered the possibility of a raid on Staten Island almost as soon as Howe's fleet set sail.  Writing to Colonel Dayton on July 26th, three days after Howe put to sea,  Washington ordered; 

"I wish you to take every possible pains in your power, by sending trusty persons to Staten Island, to obtain intelligence of the Enemy's situation and numbers, What kind of Troops they are [and how many,] and what Guards they have, their strength and where posted. My view in this, is, that his Lordship, when he arrives may make an attempt upon the Enemy there with his Division, If it should appear from a full consideration of all circumstances and the information you obtain, that it can be done with a strong prospect of Success." 

To General Alexander "Lord Stirling", Washington wrote that same day that if it turned out that Staten Island were garrisoned merely by Loyalist regiments

"amounting to about 1000 Men, as a deserter says, a descent may be made to great advantage. Colo. Dayton will procure all the Boats there abouts previous to your coming, and if upon your arrival you think the attempt practicable you may make the tryal. That you may not go needlessly out of your Way, Colo. Dayton is to send an Officer to you, to acquaint you with his intelligence from which you may judge whether it will be prudent to make an attack. Your Lordship is not by any means to understand the above as a positive order, but a matter left intirely to your own discretion, I would not have it undertaken, if there is the smallest Risque, for I do not think we are at this time intitled to put any thing to the hazard."

It was not to be.  Stirling wanted to bring his full division together at Basking Ridge, though Washington wrote him on July 27th that Dayton and Ogden's regiments would remain detached for the present

"for the protection of the Inhabitants and to prevent plundering parties from Staten Island, till I have more certain advice of the Enemy's destination against Philadelphia."  

On July 30th Washington learned that Stirling had halted at Bound Brook, and expecting Howe to approach Delaware Bay he ordered Stirling to march to Trenton "provided the expedition to Staten Island did not take place." 

As for Dayton and Ogden's Jerseymen, on July 31st they were ordered to cross the Delaware and make for Philadelphia.  This was countermanded the next day, for Howe had been sighted heading out to sea from the mouth of the Delaware, so the 3rd and 1st NJ were sent marching toward Peekskill on the East side of the Hudson.  They were subsequently ordered to halt, and await further intelligence of the enemy before proceeding to the New York Highlands if Howe had turned toward New England or the Hudson.  On August 14th Washington wrote to Dayton, who was then at Acquakanock on the Passaic River in New Jersey, once again seeking intelligence of the enemy's strength at King's Bridge above Manhattan and on Staten Island. 

On the 22nd of August, Dayton and Ogden were ordered to rejoin the New Jersey Brigade in Stirling's Division, for it was now clear that that Howe had sailed into the Chesapeake and was threatening Philadelphia.  Washington intended that they be relieved by New Jersey militia, but by then the situation in the field had changed rather significantly.  Unbeknownst to Washington, the two New Jersey regiments had taken part that very day in a raid on Staten Island lead by General John Sullivan that was not part of Washington's current plans and ultimately became the subject of a court martial.  How that situation came about will be the subject of a subsequent post in this series.

 

 

 

Lieutenant McMichael, Deserter and Casualty of War (Part II)

The journal of Lt. Ebenezer Elmer recounts the defection of Lt. William McMichael of the 3rd New Jersey in 1776 and what befell him and his pursuers in the wilds of the New York Frontier.

[Friday, August 16th, 1776]  "About 12 o'clock and express arrived from Col. Dayton at Fort Schuyler, informing us that Lt. Loyd, who commanded the party sent to the Lake [Oneida], arrived there just as McMichael and his confederates had embarked to cross; they fired several guns to no effect, and there being no craft that they could get, were obliged to quit pursuit."

A subsequent entry gave a somewhat different account of the escape as news of  the flight of McMichael continued to filter back through the various detachments of the regiment.

[August 17th, 1776 - German Flats]  "Towards evening a man living in the Jerseys came here on his way home from Fort Schuyler.  He brings word that the two men which McMchael took from the returning scout of Enign Clerk's (whom he told that he was going to Oswego by order of Colonel Dayton to burn it down, and that he should take more men if he should meet them) were returned, leaving him on the Oneida Lake; that the pursuers were so nigh when they embarked, that McMichael pulled off with great vigor.  They being in another canoe, received several fires from the scout over their heads; that after the scout was gone, they wondered McMichael did not stay, and he continued on with speed, they began to distrust whether something was not the matter, and it was our men who fired at them.  They therefore concluded to return, for which they were exceedingly glad when they found out the plot."

These two men were previously identified by Elmer as volunteers Smith and Ridley, who were initially implicated in the desertion plot along with Lt. McMichael, and several others, including a Sergeant Newcastle of the 3rd NJ and Alexander Stewart about whom I have discovered nothing further.

Some of the men who pursued Lt. McMichael to the lake themselves ran into trouble on their return. A detachment which included Sergeants Younglove and Aitkens were attacked by about ten indians,  The Jerseymen's powder was wet and only one of their muskets would fire, but according to Elmer's Journal, the indians had better success.

"A ball took Serjeant Aitkens, of Captain Potter's Company, through the body, upon which he fell, crying out, ' I am a dead man but do not fly, if your guns will not go off, rush on them with your bayonets.'  After which Mr. Ball, their guide, went down the hill and called out for others to follow him, and they would then endeavor to make a stand.  Accordingly two of the men did, but Serjeant Younglove and one other besides the Serjeant wounded, would not.  After these three had got down the hill they heard two guns go off; They then attempted to get to the others, but found the indians pursuing them; were therefore obliged to make the best of their way off, leaving the others behind, dead or alive they could not tell.  They received several shots, but none so as to cripple them. As they left there, they soon fell in with two friendly indians of the Onondago tribe, who conducted them safely down to Fort Schuyler."

 One of the three men left behind, a private, escaped with a slight wound and hid in the woods for a week without food before he was able to make his way back to the regiment.  The two Sergeants were taken to Oswego, and news reached Elmer on August 30th that while in captivity " a Mohawk indian, being one of their young warriors, tomahawked their brains out."

The very same fate appears to have happened to Lieutenant McMichael.

[Friday, September 6th, 1776] By Mr. patterson, who came here yesterday, we hear that McMichael was killed on this month after he passed over the Lakes, by the same indians who killed Younglove and Aitkin, taking him to be a spy - a very just end for such a traitor to come to."

And that is all that Elmer had to say about the matter.  From snippet views of the brief references to Lt. McMichael in the Journal of Captain Joseph Bloomfield of the 3rd New Jersey, these add little to our understanding of McMichael's defection.  We have it on Elmer's authority that he was killed by Indians at Oswego, but his source is secondhand and it would be good to find corroborating evidence.  As it stands, Lt. McMichael remains an enigma, a patriot who turned his coat and may, or may not, have been killed by those he was seeking to join.

Who was Lieutenant William McMichael, and What Made Him Run? (Part 1)

In the summer of 1776, the 3rd New Jersey regiment occupied several outposts in the valley of the Mohawk River on the New York frontier.  1st Lieutenant William McMichael was based at Fort Schuyler, and on August 14th he deserted, apparently with the intention of going over to the enemy, and was later killed by Indians. 

I have been curious about Lt. McMichael since coming across the brief entries for his name in Heitman's and Stryker's registers of officers in the Revolution.  I am not certain that I have learned much more with any certainty since delving into his story, but what follows [in 2 parts] is the documentation I have found, along with what it may suggest as to his actions and their possible motives.

William McMichael was enlisted on February 7th, 1776 as 1st Lieutenant of Captain Ross's 5th Company in the 3rd New Jersey Regiment (1st establishment).  His name appears on a list of the officers of the regiment published in the Pennsylvania Gazette on February 21st, 1776. 

I have not been able to determine his place of origin, nor whether he was any relation to diarist Lt. James McMichael of the Pennsylvania Line, Edward McMichael  of Philadelphia, who supposedly served as Captain with the British Guides and Pioneers after deserting from the patriot forces (but see below), or Ensign William McMichael of the Pennsylvania Loyalists who previously served in the 13th Pennsylvania.

Edward McMichael is sometimes identified as a Lieutenant at Fort Schuyler in 1776, and a reprinted intelligence report from Oswego attributed to Lieutenant Edward McMichael in the patriot service in the area at this time. 

    "Was informed at Oswego that Three regiments of Ministerial Troops had arrived at Oswegatchie, at which place they were joined by a number of Tories and Indians, under the command of Colonel Johnson, and were to embark immediately on two armed vessels, bateaux and canoes, and proceed to Oswego, at which place they were to be joined by Colonel Butler, with all the Indians under his command, and likewise with Colonel Caldwell, and what regulars could be spared from Niagara.  They intended repairing Oswego Fort, as soon as possible, in order that they might hold a treaty with the Indians, and be able to defend themselves against any attack."

It would be too much of a coincidence, though for there to be two Lieutentant McMichaels who deserted to the enemy in August from the same place, as this list implies, so it is more likely that the actions of the one have been attributed to the other.  Alternatively, William McMichael may also have used the name Edward, as there is no record for a Lieutenant Edward McMichael in Heitman's register.

The best contemporary source of information about the actions of Lieutenant William McMichael comes from the journal of a fellow officer, Lieutenant Ebenezer Elmer of the 3rd New Jersey. 

    [Friday August 2nd, 1776, German Flats]  "Lt. Wm. McMichael came down here to day from Fort Stanwix;     he being just returned from Oswego, where he had been on a scouting party, and finding the Colonel and     the General were down here, he proceeded right on."

These remarks would tend to reinforce the possibility that it was Lieutenant William McMichael, and not another named Edward, who forwarded the intelligence from Oswego.  Elmer's next mention of him, however, firmly establishes that William McMichael intended to desert to he enemy.

 [Wednesday, August 14th, 1776, German Flats] "...I became acquainted with a most shocking affair between Lt. McMichael, volunteer Smith, Sgt. Newcastle of our Battalion, Alex. Stewart, one Ridley, a clerk of Major Lundie's, and one more, in a secret plot, endevouring to go off to the enemy. some of whom it is supposed, are already gone.  Ensign Kinney was immediately sent on express to Col. Dayton at Fort Schuyler, as McMichael set out from here last night with a pretense to go there.  How it may turn out I cannot tell; they have without any doubt acted a very dastardly, treacherous and devilish part."

[Thursday, August 15th, 1776] "Lieutenant Daniel Pierson came down this forenoon as an express from Col. Dayton at Fort Schuyler, informing us that Lieutenant McMichael, with volunteer Smith and Ridley, set out from there yesterday at about 12 oclock, and were no doubt making the best of their way for the enemy.  That as soon as Col. Dayton became acquainted with the matter by Mr. Kinney, which was almost night, he offered a reward of twenty dollars a head for them, dead or alive.  Upon which Captain Reading, Lt. Loyd and Ballard, with about 30 men, set out immediately upon the scout after them."

Desertion was a chronic problem in 1776 and not only for Dayton's regiment, but an officer conspiring with  enlisted men to desert to the enemy was something different.  The timing of this defection, barely a month after the Declaration of Independance, may be significant, as there were a number of former patriots who were willing to take up arms to defend their Liberties but not to make a final break with the Crown.

Elmer's journal describes the pursuit, and how the hunters became the hunted as they went beyond the relative safety of their garrisons.  We will pick up that part of the story in a subsequent post.